DOI: 10.38007/978-1-80053-628-9

Therefore, to improve safety responsibility management in EPC contracting and provide a theoretical foundation for the distribution of safety responsibilities among stakeholders, this study focuses on the allocation of safety responsibilities in EPC project contracting. First, relevant literature on the EPC contracting model, construction project safety responsibilities, and safety responsibility allocation is reviewed. Second, based on stakeholder theory and using Mitchell’s scoring method, the safety-related stakeholders in EPC contracting are categorized, and key stakeholders are identified. The study further explores the influencing factors and strategic behaviors related to safety responsibilities for definitive stakeholders, laying the groundwork for a bargaining game model of safety responsibility allocation under incomplete information. 

Next, theories of incomplete information, Harsanyi transformation, and bargaining games are introduced. Through Harsanyi transformation, incomplete information is converted into complete but imperfect information, enabling the use of standard analytical techniques to address incomplete information and establish reasonable assumptions for bargaining games. Based on this, a bargaining game model for safety responsibility allocation under incomplete information is constructed. The Rubinstein model, along with the finite-stage backward induction method proposed by Sáked and Sutton, is applied to solve this infinite-horizon bargaining game. 

Finally, from a practical perspective, the study examines the impact of stakeholders' attitudes toward assuming safety responsibilities. It further explores safety responsibility allocation under incomplete information while considering stakeholders’ preference for bearing safety responsibilities. By introducing this preference, utility functions are used to describe stakeholders' attitudes. Expected utility functions for responsible entities are formulated and solved based on the principle of certainty equivalence, deriving the optimal safety responsibility allocation. Furthermore, the relationship between safety responsibility attitudes and safety responsibility allocation is analyzed. 

The study proposes a preliminary method for calculating the safety responsibility allocation ratio between owners and EPC contractors under incomplete information. Building on this, it incorporates stakeholders' attitudes toward safety responsibility, obtaining the optimal allocation ratio while considering these attitudes. Additionally, it examines the relationship and trends between safety responsibility attitudes and responsibility allocation ratios in EPC contracting. This approach ensures a balanced allocation of safety responsibilities from the perspective of benefit distribution between owners and EPC contractors.

During subsequent collaborations, safety responsibility allocation strategies can be transformed into effective safety management measures, forming an interactive and mutually reinforcing system. This research provides new theoretical insights into the allocation of safety responsibilities in EPC contracting, improves safety responsibility management, promotes the refinement of the EPC safety responsibility system, and advances the healthy and sustainable development of the EPC contracting model. 

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