The impact of culture on the economy is one of the hotspots in corporate finance research at present. This paper uses regional genealogy volumes to measure the strength of clan culture, combined with the data of A-share listed family businesses from 2010 to 2020, and uses the “differential pattern”, the traditional clan concepts of "collectivism" and "solidarity and mutual benefit" are used to study the influence of clan culture on the innovation of family enterprises. The following conclusions can be drawn from the research of this paper: clan culture can promote the innovation of family enterprises, and at the same time, when innovation investment increases, innovation efficiency also increases, which can alleviate the current problem of “high input and low output” for enterprises. It can be seen that clan culture, as an informal system, plays a key role in the innovation of family businesses, especially when the formal system in our country is not very perfect at present, clan culture as an informal system can play a role in this.

Jialing Zhang. Clan Culture and Business Innovation——Evidence from Chinese Family-owned Public Companies. International Journal of Business Management and Economics and Trade (2023), Vol. 4, Issue 1: 8-18. https://doi.org/10.38007/IJBMET.2023.040102.

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