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International Journal of Social Sciences and Economic Management, 2026, 7(1); doi: 10.3807/IJSSEM.2026.070105.

The Impact of Informal Board Hierarchy on Corporate Debt Default Risk

Author(s)

Zixiang Yang

Corresponding Author:
Zixiang Yang
Affiliation(s)

Department of Business, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, China

Abstract

This paper employs a sample of non-financial listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 2008 to 2020 to empirically examine the impact of the informal hierarchy within the board of directors on corporate debt default risk. The results indicate that a clearer informal hierarchy in the board is associated with lower corporate debt default risk. Specifically, the informal hierarchy of the board influences debt default risk through two channels: the governance effect and the resource effect. The findings of this study provide insights for mitigating corporate debt default risk.

Keywords

Informal Board Hierarchy, Debt Default Risk

Cite This Paper

Zixiang Yang. The Impact of Informal Board Hierarchy on Corporate Debt Default Risk. International Journal of Social Sciences and Economic Management (2026), Vol. 7, Issue 1: 36-50. https://doi.doi.org/10.3807/IJSSEM.2026.070105.

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